@DesheShai

Buddhism is an atheistic (not anti-theistic) religion (I'm not an atheist btw)

I did both lol

1. Kaspa's MuHash vulnerability is not immanently exploitable. Not even for a quantum computer. Even after quantum reduction, you still need to solve a non-trivial problem (called MRSS). 2. However, this problem is not considered hard enough for cryptography. Why? Because algorithms have been steadily chipping away at it's hardness, more than sufficiently to debunk the hardness conjectures made in the original MuHash paper 3. I find this concerning because MuHash sits exactly at a point where we want "everlasting security". It is not used to secure a wallet but the integrity of the entire chain. A single collision is all you need to rewrite the entire history with a constant size attack (unlike Bitcoin where the difficulty of the attack grows with how deep you want to reorg). For Kaspa to become a trillion dollar coin, this will just not do. 4. A first step towards a solution will be to replace MuHash with a post-quantum incremental hash. The consequence is that to exploit MuHash for a history rewrite you need a longer chain that goes all the way back to before the change point. This doesn't mean there aren't more subtle attacks that remain completely intact. In particular, validating txns from before the change without trusting an archival node remains a huge issue. (And not the only one) 5. If I had to point out the urgency of implementing the previous clause, I'd say medium-low to medium. Not an immediate concern, but should probably be patched well before the turn of the decade. 6. Yes, short conf times and rapid inclusion are definitely safeguards against quantum front-running

Is forty the largest number whose name is in alphabetical order?

If an occasional offhand remark every couple of months constitutes "fud" in your book then you have no business being in crypto lol